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Abstract The reason why orthodox quantum theory necessarily invokes consciousness is explained.
Several procedures whereby the Born probability rule can be introduced are discussed, and reasons
are given for prefering one in which consciousness selects a unique realised world. Consciousness
is something outside of the laws of physics (quantum mechanics), but it has a real effect upon the
experienced world. Finally, orthodox quantum theory is shown to require that consciousness acts
non-locally.
A possible answer to the question in the title of this talk would be to say that we can explain con-
sciousness. That would be false; we have no more idea how to explain consciousness than anyone else, which
means we have NO idea! In fact the whole idea of trying to explain consciousness is probably a mistake;
consciousness just is.
The proper answer to the question is that we cannot understand quantum theory without invoking
consciousness.3
Quantum theory is a wonderful elegant theory, which, at least in principle, allows us to calculate the
properties of all physical (and chemical) systems. It gives correct results for the probabilities of particular
results of an enormous range of experiments. It is accurate and universal, and no violations of its predictions
are known, even where those predictions are very counter-intuitive.
BUT, if quantum theory really applies to all systems, then, except in very special circumstances, there
can never be any observations, i.e., there can be no events for which the above statistical predictions could
apply.
This fact is so important, and so simple, that we shall discuss an example. We imagine that there is a
system, the one to be “measured”, which is in a state that I describe as |+ >. (There is no need to worry
what this means or why I use such a funny notation).
This system in measured with an apparatus A, and I suppose that after the measurement the combined
system can be described by |+, A+ >. What this means is that the + reading on the apparatus corresponds
to the system being in the state +. Generally the apparatus is not isolated but in interaction with an
environment (air, microwave background, black-holes, strings, etc.). Call all this E, then the full state is
|+, A+, E+ >. Of course this will in general be changing with time, but I do not need to indicate this
explicitly.
Next, I suppose that Melinda looks at the apparatus. This puts her brain, denoted byMe, into a certain
state. Hence the state of the relevant system is now
|+, A+, E+,Me+ > . (1)
1 Text of talk to be given at the Tucson II conference, Towards a Science of Consciousness, 1996
2 e.j.squires@durham.ac.uk
3 The interpretation problem of quantum theory and the hard problem of consciousness also share the
property of attracting articles that claim to provide a solution but in fact do not address the problem.
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Everything up to here is perfectly straightforward. Assuming that I knew the physical structure of the
apparatus (not too difficult to imagine), of the environment (a bit harder) and of Melinda’s brain (harder
still), then the evolution to this final state could be calculated from the Schro¨dinger equation.
Notice that it is totally irrelevant to the discussion what is the precise nature of the physical brain;
we need make no assuptions whatever about that, except that the brain is a physical thing and is therefore
described by the laws of quantum theory.
Now we need to introduce the bit that we none of us know anything about. Presumably the Me+ state
of Melinda’s brain corresponds to some sort of “pattern” which her consciousness, knowing something about
the apparatus A, interprets as meaning that the system was in the state +. To be concrete, suppose the
pattern is as given in fig. 1.
We can then repeat the above discussion with some other state of the system. Let us call this state
|− >. In an obvious generalisation of the notation used above, the state after measurement will now be
|−, A−, E−,Me− > . (2)
Again there will be some pattern in Melinda’s brain which her consciousness recognises as meaning that the
system was in the state −. Suppose this time the pattern is as in fig. 2.
At this stage we do not have anything that is different from classical physics. The calculation yields
a particular result which is interpreted by consciousness. These however are the “special circumstances”
referred to above, where there is no measurement problem.
The problem arises because it is possible, and indeed in some cases very easy, to prepare a state which
is not + or −, but is a “bit of each”. We write this as a|+ > + b|− >, where the relative magnitudes of
a and b tell us something about how much of + compared to − the state contains. In practice most states
that are observed will have this form. (To prevent any possible misunderstanding here it is important to
emphasise that this new state is not just a way of saying that the state might be + or it might be −, and
that we do not know which. Quantum theory allows us to discuss this situation - the state is then called a
mixed state - but it is not what we have here.)
What happens when we measure this new state using the same apparatus as before? Here is another
piece of quantum magic. Given the results of the previous calculations, it is a trivial matter to calculate
what happens. In fact the final state becomes
a|+, A+, E+,Me+ > + b|−, A−, E−,Me− > . (3)
We do not get one pattern, or the other, but something that is a bit of one and a bit of the other. There is
nothing obviously remarkable about that; we started with the system in a state which we wrote as a “sum”
of system states, and we finish with a similar type of sum of observed states.
Now come the surprises.
1. It is a simple matter of fact that Melinda will experience either the + state or the − state. As far as
her experience is concerned the state (3) will be exactly as if it were either that in (1) or that in (2).
To be careful here, I should say that this is what Melinda will tell us. In order to be sure (see below)
we can check by doing the observation ourselves. Then I will be aware of either the pattern of fig 1 or the
pattern of figure 2 - certainly not the “sum” of the two patterns as in fig. 3.
Notice that this one result of which I am aware exists in Consciousness, but not in “physics”, i.e., no
particular result is present in the state of the physical world as it is calculated according to quantum theory.
If this is “dualism” then I am happy to be called a dualist.
2. The above fact follows from orthodox quantum theory - in the sense that will be made clear immedi-
ately. Because I sometimes read statements that seem to deny this, and because it is important to be precise
about what is meant, and because, if we think about it, it is rather amazing, I shall derive it.
To do this I suppose that Melinda had agreed to write a 0 on a piece of paper as soon as she knew
whether the system was in the state + or the state −. Note that she does not write down what it is, only
that she knows what it is. Clearly, in both the cases where the system was in the state + or −, as soon as
she had looked at the apparatus, then she would have written the 0. It then follows trivially from standard
quantum theory that in the case where the state was the sum of the two, she would again write down the 0.
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Thus, she would tell the world that she had become aware of either the pattern in fig. 1, or the pattern in
figure 2. Every physical action she took would convey this message. I think this means that she would indeed
have become aware of one result, as indeed we know happens in practice. Otherwise she would consistently
be telling the world, and herself, a lie.
This seems to imply that orthodox quantum theory has told us something about how consciousness
actually works. Of course it cannot do this. We have inserted an assumption of consistency. All Melinda’s
physical actions, as long as they are governed by quantum theory will imply that she knows a unique result.
The assumption is that this actually means that she does know such a result. One could imagine (just about)
that, on the contrary, she was not aware of any result, but that nevertheless she put the 0 on the paper, and
in all other ways behaved as though she did.
It is worth noting that we cannot run this argument with a computer (try it). It works because Melinda
is conscious and it therefore makes sense to talk about “knowing”. Computers, on the other hand do not
know anything, and we would not have any way of giving the essential instruction to write a 0 as soon as
the result is known.
3. Here is something that does not follow from the simple evolution equation of quantum theory, i.e.,
the Schro¨dinger equation, which is all we have used so far. In a large set of identical runs of the above
experiment the number of times Melinda would see + and − would be in the ratio |a|2/|b|2. This is a “rule”
which is sort of added to quantum theory. It is called the Born rule (after Max Born who first proposed it),
and it has been confirmed repeatably in myriads of experiments.
So, where is the problem, and what has all this got to do with consciousness?
The complete description of the “physics” in orthodox quantum theory is the state displayed above, which
contains both terms, i.e. both “results”. The unique result of which I am aware does not exist in physics -
but only in consciousness. The Born rule does not have anything to say about physics - it says something
about consciousness.
I must qualify the above by emphasising the fact that I am speaking of orthodox quantum theory. I
could add something to physics (e.g. the Bohm hidden variable model) or I could change it (e.g. the explicit
collapse models of GRW/Pearle etc), so that the result would be in the physics. Even then the properties of
consciousness would appear, but all that is another story which we shall not follow here.
Naive Many-Minds Interpretation
To continue, we note that the simplest possibility for what is happening would be that after the mea-
surement there are two “Melinda’s”, one of which has one experience, and one of which has the other. We
need have no concern that this does not appear to Melinda to be what is happening, because it is guaranteed
by quantum theory that each “Melinda” will be unaware of the existence of the other, and will indeed have
no possibility of knowing about the other (this is true for all practicable purposes - if she were sufficiently
clever she could perhaps devise means of checking whether the other Melinda really exists). What we have
here is the “naive” many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory; it is better called the “many-views” or
“many minds” interpretation [1,..4] because the physical world, described by the quantum state, e.g., as
displayed above in our simple example (eq. 3), is always ONE thing.
Two points should be noted here. First, the experienced world is precisely that, the world as experienced.
It is not identical to the physical world. When we “measure” something, we experience a particular result,
but, in general, that result does not refer to anything that was there before our experience of it, or even after
the experience; it exists only in consciousness. Secondly, all this has been achieved with nothing beyond
orthodox quantum theory.
However, although it is superficially very attractive, this naive interpretation DOES NOT WORK. The
reason is simple - it contains no probabilities, i.e., no Born rule. There are not “degrees of existence”;
everything will exist regardless of how small its probability should be according to the Born rule. To put this
another way, probabilities are for something to “happen” and here nothing has actually happened. Now I am
aware that the foundations of the whole theory of proability are very unsure, even in the classical domain,
but this should not prevent us from recognising that at this stage we do not have a satisfactory theory of
the quantum world.
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One Mind Interpretation
To make progress, we can propose instead that, although the description of the physics is as given by
the state above, with both terms, consciousness actually selects one term [ 5,6,7]. Normally this will happen
at random with the weights given by |a|2 and |b|2, so that the Born rule is guaranteed. (In general to say
that something happens at random requires that we give a weight, and there really are no other possibilities,
so the Born rule is very natural.)
What we have now is I believe an acceptable solution to the measurement problem of quantum theory.
It has several merits.
1. In principle it allows for consciousness to be “efficacious”, i.e., to be able to change the experienced
world. In other words it can help to explain what consciousness is for. The point here is that there may
be circumstances in which there is a quantum superposition in the brain which is not correlated to things
outside the brain (like in the displayed state above). Then the selection, which perhaps need not be random,
could determine the action that a person takes. This would correspond to our experience of free-will, and it
would have an effect on the experienced world, although it would not alter the total wavefunction. In other
words it would not violate the requirement (for some people) that physics is ‘closed”.
Of course, at this stage of our discussion (but not before) we have to make some assumptions about
physical brains. In order for there to be the possibility of what we are describing here to happen we have to
accept that brains are genuinely quantum systems that cannot be described by classical physics. I do not find
this difficult. Although surgeons may see brains as warm wet matter, which from their point of view can be
described perfectly well by classical physics, it remains true that there is no such thing as classical matter.
Without quantum theory there would be no matter. To say that quantum effects, as we are describing here,
cannot occur in brains, would be rather like telling a nineteenth century physicist who had just happened
to have invented quantum theory that, even if it were true, there would be no possibility of ever detecting
its effects in the real world.
2. The association of consciousness with “selection” seems to be something that others, from very
different arguments, want to make. For a recent example Cotterill [8] writes “consciousness is for....evaluation
and choice”.
3. There would be a unique “real”, i.e., experienced, world. The non-selected parts of the wavefunction
would not really exist. To have an analogy here, imagine a sheet of white paper. By putting a suitable mask
on this we could obtain a picture of say a person -see figure 4. Now different masks would produce different
pictures ( worlds) - indeed all possible pictures. It would be a misuse of language however to say that the
sheet of white paper contained all the pictures - only the one selected by the mask would exist.
4. As with most versions of the “many-worlds” interpretations, this allows us to use anthropic arguments
to explain the apparent coincidences necessary for our existence, but here it is with a unique world, rather
then a scenario in which all things conceivable actually exist. The argument would be that in some sort of
universal wavefunction, consciousness selects a part in which consciousness can exist.
Alternative Many-Views Models.
Several attempts have been made to give a meaning to probability when all experiences occur. For
example, Albert and Loewer [3] and Albert [9] have suggested that associated with every person there are
a large number of minds, and that each selects at random as with the single experience proposal above.
Again this seems to work, but clearly the number has to be very large, otherwise there will be the possibility
of meeting “zombies”. In fact Albert and Loewer suggest an infinite number, which I find hard to accept,
because I am not sure that I really know what it means to have an infinite number of “objects” associated
with a given person. Even worse is the fact that they want a continuous infinity. This runs into the problem
that there is no natural measure on a continuous infinity: it just does not mean anything to say, for example,
that “more” minds see one result than another. The same problem is met by Lockwood [4, 10] who proposes
instead to have all “minds” labelled by a continuous parameter, e.g., 0 < λ < 1, so that a certain fraction
of the line goes to one result, and another fraction to another, etc., in each case so as to give the Born rule.
Again, this suffers from what seems to me to be the insuperable problem that there is no natural measure
on such a line.
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I should add that, on aesthetic grounds, I myself am more comfortable with the idea that there is one
world, rather than having to accept that all things that can be actually are, however improbable the Born
rule would make them. It just seems too much to have to believe that there really are people, holding
conferences on physics and consciousness, etc., who have never experienced interference, or read about it or
met anybody who had! They are going to have an awful shock next time they see a thin film of oil on water
(or at least “a large part”, whatever that may mean in this context, of all of them are!)
Non-locality
Finally, we must discuss the issue of non-locality. It is sometimes stated that one of the advantages
of the “many-worlds” style of solutions to the measurement problem is that they do not suffer from the
non-locality which is all too evident in the Bohm model or in collapse models. To some extent this is true;
the non-locality is removed from the physics because it only arises from the results of measurements, and
so does not occur if there are no such results. However, it is still around; it has simply been removed to
“consciousness”.
We can see this if we consider how consciousness can take note of the quantum probability. To do this
we need to think a little more about how we locate the “patterns” that correspond to a given experience.
Suppose that the quantum state is given by |Ψ(x, y, t) >, where x stands for the variables of particles in
the brain and y for particles in the system, the apparatus and the environment. The displayed state (3)
above is just one particular example of such a state. To see a pattern we must project this onto a state
of some presumed “consciousness basis” in the brain. If we denote this by states |Cn(x) >, where the
n labels possible experiences, then the probablity of the nth experience is, according to quantum theory,
| < C(x)|Ψ(x, y, t) > |2. This however is not a number, but a function of the positions of all the other
particles (some of these may well be thousands of miles away!). To get a number we must integrate over all
these positions. This of course is horrendously non-local in realistic measurement situations. In other words,
consciousness, if it is to “know about” probabilities, as it must if we are to obtain the Born rule, cannot be
a local thing.
This is very important because it means that in the selection model there will only be one selection,
not one for every separate person, a fact which ensures the essential property that all observers will make
the same selection. Another way of saying this is to say that consciouness must be thought of as being ONE
thing. This is something in which Schro¨dinger firmly believed, and it may be a contribution that quantum
physics can make to the study of consciousness, thereby guaranteeing that quantum physicists continue to
have a place at meetings like this.
Related Ideas
The idea that consciousness has to be introduced in order to understand quantum theory has been
around since the 1920’s. Apart from the work mentioned above, recent contributions are due to Hodgson
[11], Mavromatos and Nanopolous [12], Penrose [13], Page [14] and Stapp [15]. These models have many
features in common, and in common with the model that I am advocating here (in particular, the selection
model shares many of the features discussed by Stapp in his recent articles [16,17]). The principle difference
is that, in varying ways these authors have models in which the operation of consciousness is associated
with some sort of explicit wavefunction collapse, so that the physics is not given exactly by the Schro¨dinger
equation. It seems to follow that there will be observable differences between the predictions of these models
and those of standard quantum theory (cf., for example, [18]). This is not necessarily a bad thing, but the
models need to be made sufficiently precise in order that these differences can be calculated.
There may be a more serious objection in that a proper description of the collapse requires a new
equation to replace the Schro¨dinger equation. Examples of such equations already exist of course (see [19]
and references therein), but, at least in the context of the present discussion, they suffer from the fact that
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there is no reason why the collapse effect has anything to do with consciousness.4 Rather the collapse is
a universal phenomena, with the rate being very small, i.e. negligible, for microscopic systems, but being
proportional to something like the number of particles, so that it is large in the macroscopic world. If we follow
this line too closely then we are in danger of saying that consciousness arises, like rapid collapse, simply
from having large systems. I believe Stapp, at least, would reject this suggestion, in my opinion rightly.
Maybe things look different if the stochastic nature of the collapse process arises from something that is
non-computable. This might provide a link with possible non-algorithmic aspects of conscious thought.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Fig. 1. A hypothetical neural pattern which Melinda interprets as the result +.
Fig. 2. A hypothetical neural pattern which Melinda interprets as −.
Fig. 3. A possible “sum” of neural patterns corresponding to the superposed state. But Melinda’s experience
corresponds either to the pattern in fig. 1 or to that in fig. 2.
Fig. 4. A template that produces a pink man from a sheet of pink paper. Is the man already present without
the template?
4 Some people would regard this as a virtue of these models, but they would be unlikely to attend this
conference.
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